An Institutional Theory Of Sanctions Onse... | 2007.

: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede.

The full study is available via SAGE Journals or ResearchGate . Journal of Conflict Resolution - Florida State University 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...

Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success : In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition

: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success Journal of Conflict Resolution - Florida State University

: Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions against states where they believe the political institutions will make the sanctions effective.

The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition"